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DE: ... Oh, really.

Burlatsky

MIKOYAN: He could participate in a group. So, to make the story short, those days, he even did not know anything about all the stories, absolutely.

DE: So he learned later, if at all? Did he not help draft the December state^{ment} to the Presidium because that I think he said he did.

MIKOYAN: He did, yes, but this was ____.

DE: That's very interesting, yeah. Have you heard anything about the mood of Khrushchev when he wrote this Friday night letter? Was there anything special about his mood?

MIKOYAN: Friday night or ...?

DE: The long one that arrived Friday night, the long, four-part cable from Khrushchev. The one that arrived first and then the tricky letter arrived second.

MIKOYAN: Well, I don't know.

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DE: You don't know anything about his mood when he wrote that or anything.

DE: I'll tell you. I won't go into now but ... [TAPE CUT].

[TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: THE PERSON IS ABOVE IS NOTED AS MIKOYAN BUT SOUNDS LIKE ASSATIANI].

DE: ... but he did not chance the low level and reconnaissance.

MIKOYAN: Why, it cannot explain. I don't understand. It's easier to [INAUDIBLE].

DE: Well, because they felt the U2 was totally vulnerable to the SAM. So if they're going to start shooting at the U2 then it's a suicide mission. But the low level, the Navy was happy to send low level planes in. They wanted to give a little combat experience. After they had been flying all day and they hadn't been hit, strictly speaking, they had been hit but they hadn't been downed. They did hit some planes but they didn't destroy them. Another was, the Navy and the Army and the Airforce wanted planes shot down. So they wanted to fly that low level, they wanted an

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excuse to hit. So they were recommending a lot more low level. And Kennedy had not decided to turn off the low level because that was not a suicide mission, it was just a risk. And they felt they had to keep pressure on. So, at the very last minute, Kennedy did cancel a night reconnaissance because they thought, that would be like an attack. They were going to drop flares. So he cancelled that only at the very last minute. But the low level reconnaissance for the next day was scheduled. So he was taking a much greater risk. He probably thought that Khrushchev controlled all of that and having been warned, Khrushchev would never shoot the plane, would not allow the plane to be shot. The U.S. could not conceive that Khrushchev could not control Castro. It was out of the question. It didn't even occur.

MIKOYAN: I'm afraid that this misperception still ...

DE: Yeah, that's true. ... And, who knows? What was Khrushchev's feeling? Do you know? Was he surprised or not when Castro fired against his wishes on Saturday.

MIKOYAN: Yes, of course.

DE: He was surprised?

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MIKOYAN: First, he didn't know who did it.

DE: I'm talking about the low level, the anti-aircraft. Was he surprised when Castro insisted on firing his anti-aircraft on Friday and Saturday, on Saturday, I think it was.

MIKOYAN: Well, I don't know about.

DE: Because didn't you tell me Alexeiff asked him not to do it?

MIKOYAN: Yes, but he knew that Castro was a very stubborn person.

DE: Did Khrushchev realize that?

MIKOYAN: Yes, of course, he knew that he was not under our control.

DE: What were you doing, yourself, on Saturday, October 27th, the last day of the crises, the day before Sunday?

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MIKOYAN: Well, I don't remember exactly but usually.
[TAPE CUT].

DE: ... whereupon Kennedy said, - no public deal, through Bobby Kennedy, there will be no public deal. However, in effect, he offered a private deal. If this goes away, once this is settled, the missiles will go quickly. And he said, four or five months, he said to Drobynin, in four or five months. So my question is, he was now not offering Khrushchev anything that Khrushchev could say to the world, or even, as far as we know, say to the Soviet, Supreme Soviet, it would seem not to have done it any good at all. But the question is, did it, in his own mind feel that that was ... he had gotten a - no invasion pledge - which then was somewhat taken back. But, at least, he hoped to get a - no invasion pledge. Did you also feel that it was beneficial to him to get a private deal on the Turkish missiles?

MIKOYAN: Excuse me, was it ever taken back this pledge not to ...

DE: Well, yes, in the sense that, as you know, this is a very controversial matter but it kept getting referred to in American politics. And Rusk, several times said, - the

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pledge was premised on inspection on the ground. And since we haven't gotten inspection, there is no pledge. He said that.

MIKOYAN: He said it? I know that Reagan once said it.

DE: Reagan said that but I believe Reagan was not wrong on that point. When you read discussions of this, people are very back and forth on this question, both sides.

✓ MIKOYAN: I have my politics with that which was I expressed my opinion, publicly, I think in my article here. That inspection, had to be appropriate inspection. It was not mentioned that people in Petroskov(?) who must go to the island, appropriate inspection. And then Mr. McCone(?) offered to my father to look at the missiles on the boat.

DE: That was in New York they agreed on that. I remember that.

MIKOYAN: So, this was finished and then after the U.S. had satellites that there was no more necessity in other kind of inspection. This is inspection. And they insisted first on the U2 flights as an inspection.

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DE: But you may remember Keating returned to the attack after the crises and directly charged that many missiles were concealed in caves in Cuba where our U2 couldn't see and we did not have ground inspection. I think one could say in the U.S. side, a mini-crisis, late somewhere around December or January, where there was a lot of pressure in Congress of January of '63 where the Republicans really pressed on the issue - Kennedy has sold us out here. We're at great danger. The Soviets have brought a lot of missiles and they put them in caves. There was a lot of discussion, Salinger and others announced, - we have no reason to believe there are missiles in caves. So that was always possible. I think the best way to summarize it would be that both sides, it was one of those situations where each side allowed the other to interpret it the way it preferred, without a strong challenge to the other. In other words, we say it means this, you say it means that.

MIKOYAN: Well, I would not agree because when Kennedy was killed and my father came to Washington, he met Lyndon Johnson and Lyndon Johnson told him that the pledge was valid for our administration and for all future American.

DE: I think, by the way, that that is separate ... but for Johnson to say that was binding for Johnson. I mean that

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was good for him to say that. You had that. And if another President came along, but Reagan comes along and says, - well, I don't interpret it that way. I would say, in other words, that was like a new commitment for Johnson. Because up till that point, I would say, in fact this, I'd follow directions clearly. So long as Kennedy was alive, he and Rusk had built a position so that they could tell the right-wing, - we have not make a clear commitment. That is what they did say, - we haven't made a clear commitment. And then Johnson comes along and says, - we have. That's fine. Now you have a commitment. But Kennedy was being, see, what I didn't understand at the time was, how strongly the military and the right-wing wanted to invade Cuba at that time and how close Kennedy had been to considering that. Given that, his failure to invade Cuba was seen as a major failure by the Pentagon. The rest of the public, as a whole, saw it as a great success. And the Congress, even the Republicans in Congress, had to accept that it was a success. They couldn't fight it. Although they tried to raise this business about the caves but it didn't get anywhere. But I can tell you, I didn't know about Mongoose and I didn't know about the invasion planning of October. I had been in Los Angeles at that time or I might have come across it. It's the kind of thing I might have known about if I were

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in town, in Washington. But I didn't come to Washington until the night of Kennedy's speech. So I didn't know about that planning. I thought that the military had had only two weeks to think about invading. Therefore, I couldn't understand why the military and the Pentagon were acting virtually on the verge of a coup, at that time. I have never, in 15 years connected with that. I'm don't say, they were going to have a coup. That's not only the closest to it that we ever got but I would say it was the only time when it seemed a serious consideration. And the point wasn't that people were talking about a coup. I didn't hear anything like that. What I did hear was sheer, savage hatred of Kennedy. And that was just inexplicable to me. I thought, granted, he hasn't done what they wanted him to do. But they've only been thinking about this for two week. How could they get so excited in two weeks that they could be this disappointed when he fails to invade. The truth is, at the highest levels, he had been allowing them to consider the possibility of invading all that year, for a whole year, really going into '61.

MIKOYAN: Don't you think that they could have known about that conspiracy against Kennedy in 1963?

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DE: No, I don't believe that. In other words, am I connecting this to '63 and I did not mean to connect it. I don't connect it. So let me be clear on that. I don't want to say but I don't want to be quoted on this, - now that you've raised the point, I won't rule out the possibility that there is some connection. But I wouldn't pin it precisely on this so much. If there's a connection it would have to do more with, disappointment with his whole policy and especially there is some reason to think the disappointment over his willingness to consider rapprochement with Cuba in '63 and his overthrow of Diem(?) in '63 and his test ban in '63. There was a general detente going on. I think that might have been connected and it might have had some connections with their feelings about '62 but I really don't want to be quoted on that. And I don't feel that very strongly. But one thing I will say though, if it's clearly distinguished from that point, is this - that I became conscious in the Pentagon of an absolutely unparallel degree of disappointment, frustration and hatred about Kennedy after the missile crises, in the month after the missile crises, in the Pentagon. And it was quite puzzling to me. And this was in the context of the fact that they already didn't like Kennedy. They disliked him. And they hated McNamara. So it wasn't as though he was popular earlier. It was just that the degree

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was very sharply different at this point. And, in retrospect ...

MIKOYAN: Maxwell Taylor and ...

DE: No, no, I don't say that he, Maxwell Taylor personally was closer to Kennedy and McNamara.

MIKOYAN: So, whom you mean?

DE: The other Chiefs, people like, I was dealing with the air staff people, people in the airforce, people in the airforce, a number of them and they were, of course, under General LeMay. And I'm sure this was true of LeMay at this point. LeMay was basically a very disciplined author. He wasn't one for a coup. He was quite obedient. That didn't mean he liked civilians. He basically hated civilians. But he, I believe, was willing to accept civilian authority. And I don't think he would have been a coup person. But his hatred was extreme at that point. Anderson is another possibility. You know Anderson was fired at that time. Here's a very important point. A major revelation, in this thing I just gave you, Sergo. By the way, are you ^{called} ~~cold~~ ^{or} Sergo, just when you're around Sergai.

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MIKOYAN: Sergo. Do you mean that coup d'etat was discussed by them?

DE: I don't know but I would suppose not. What I would say is that this was an atmosphere when it would not have been dismissed as, let's just say an atmosphere of hatred for the President, a feeling that he's betrayed the country. It's not a healthy situation for democracy.

MIKOYAN: In any case, I think that for America coup d'etat is impossible.

DE: No, I can't agree with that.

MIKOYAN: It's easier to kill the man that, than to overthrow him by force or maybe, what they did with Nixon, impeachment.

MBG: That's the hardest to do.

MIKOYAN: Either to impeach or to kill but not to overthrow by force.

DE: No, I don't really ...

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MIKOYAN: Don't you think so?

DE: To say that an overthrow is impossible is, I think, very misleading. I would say that for the military to take over in the U.S. is not really more unlikely than that for happen in Chile. Chile really was a very well founded democratic government with civilian control. And there was great resistance to the idea of a coup in Chile. And it was not until the Chief of Staff and his Deputy were both assassinated by CIA that somebody was found who was willing to overthrow and even then it took several years of pressure to do it. So, it wasn't easy but it was possible and in the U.S.

MIKOYAN: In the States?

DE: Frankly, that's another whole subject. And I don't say this would be likely to happen. I would mention two real possibilities.

MIKOYAN: Do you that Dubrynin or no?

DE: Gromyko said ...

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MIKOYAN: [UNINTELLIGIBLE]. ... representative of the KGB.

DOB?
Fomin

DE: Is he still around, by the way?

MIKOYAN: He is still alive but he is in a sclerosis(?) is too bad. He was participating in that conference. His talk was just not interesting. He repeated things, details which were not interesting, not important. He had five minutes, six minutes but he talked for 15 minutes and he didn't say anything. Not because he concealed it but he's just too old.

DE: But he said the coup, he thought was possible? That was his judgment.

MIKOYAN: No, his information at that time to Moscow was that there is a danger of a coup from the Pentagon.

DE: I would say this. If there ever was danger of a coup and if you were to list the times when there was danger of a coup, I would be put this at the top of the list, that moment. And, as I say, the reason for that was, the reason was that they had been thinking of invasion for at least a year, they had been preparing intensely for it, for several weeks, before the missiles were discovered, then they were

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given an excuse beyond their dreams. Not just the missiles but apparent Soviet deception, secrecy, lies, ominous. The whole country was behind them and Kennedy backed out, as they saw it. So, I think it was just incomprehensible and I think they thought that it would have been justified to have a coup then, it was just whether they were ready to do it. But now, I want to come back to that. But first, let me ask you this question. When he said ^{Fomin} Foeman(?) said this, how has that come out? Did he say that at the Moscow conference? - If you want to take this, by the way, feel free. I can give you a copy of this if you want. Would you like me to send you a copy of this tape?

MIKOYAN: Oh, if you can do it.

[SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN].

MIKOYAN: We did not need this story with missiles to be an argument for Khrushchev, etc.. First of all, he was a dictator to such a degree that he did not need it even. He did not need it.

MBG: For what?

DE: He didn't need to give any explanation.

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MIKOYAN: Absolutely. Anyway, he announced that was his return(?) and everybody _____. And the second thing, those missiles, it had been decided to remove them from Turkey nine months ago.

DE: No, that was the story that has often been put out. But that was not, in fact, the case. That was not the case. That is a recent development, that it's become very clear now.

MIKOYAN: You think so?

DE: I'm sure of that now.

MIKOYAN: Explain for why this had been decided nine months ago and then they say that the White House thought that the missiles were no more there. But in the _____ exchange, they say, - but we must first speak with the Turks. I was surprised. If this had been decided with the Turks nine months ago, why to talk with them now?

DE: The answer to that, I can tell you on that point is this. Several memoirs, including Bobby Kennedy's, which, by the way, I increasingly suspect was written by Sorenson

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from Bobby Kennedy's notes, from some information. There's more and more is coming out that Sorenson really wrote those, which is not bad in itself. But he has admitted, by the way, for instance, changing the notes in some respects for rather significant ways.

MBG: You mean his published stuff?

DE: Yeah, in the Harvard Lectures, he admitted, - well, it came out. But anyway Bobby Kennedy said, - the President had decided to take them out. That was flatly wrong and everybody contradicted that. In other words, whoever said that, whether it was Bobby or Sorenson, that was wrong. And what had happened was that the President several times had said, - I want this discussed with Turks. And on each occasion, the State Department either did not discuss it or raised a very preliminary discussion. You know, informally and determined that it would be a very sensitive matter and chose not to pursue it. So, it never was a serious discussion with the Turks. And, far from a decision having been made, and in fact in August, the President personally had called for a new study of whether we should raise this with the Turks, a new study.

MIKOYAN: But why they said that he thought that they ...

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DE: I'm saying that was Bobby who said that. He's wrong. Why they say that is not clear but it was a mistake in memory or a lie, one or the other. But it's definitely wrong.

MIKOYAN: Mistake, I don't see much sense in lying.

DE: I happen to know the only person on the earth who has discovered what lies behind this confusion. In fact it comes down to my other theory. I know a fact about that but it bears on a theory that I'll present in a moment. I'm not saying whether he needed the private deal. As you say, he didn't need any deal. But question - was it even helpful to him as far as you know? Did he, for example, refer to it? He didn't refer to it to the presidium. Would he have told ²Melenovsky for example, that the missiles are going? He must have. Perhaps he would have. In other words, it might help him internally even if he doesn't need it. He could tell Melenovsky, - well, they're getting rid of the missiles in Turkey. Wouldn't he have done that or do you know?

MIKOYAN: It was absolutely not important for him to apologize.

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DE: Let's say not apologize but just to say, - we got a benefit out of it. It's not an apology. He had earlier complained about the missiles in Turkey. So it mattered to him.

MIKOYAN: They were mentioned in the letter and in the talks between Drobynin and Gorby, an exchange of talks, I don't remember exactly whom but I think it was Gorby. And they understood that those missiles will go, eventually will go.

DE: To whom would he have told that?

MIKOYAN: To the people, to the population.

DE: He did not tell it to the presidium. It's not in his speech in December. You mean he wouldn't mention that. He didn't mean to mention that.

MIKOYAN: The attitude of Fidel was much more important. And from the point of view of Fidel, this was very bad.

DE: To make it a comparison.

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MIKOYAN: Yes, you take your missile from Turkey. We take our missiles from Cuba. It puts him in a position of a pawn.

DE: Now, you've said something very important. So, from that point of view, Khrushchev had a reason not to make a point of it.

MIKOYAN: Yes, exactly.

DE: So we could infer that on balance, since he couldn't make a point of it to his own public because of Castro, it probably was worth very little to him. It didn't do him any good. He might as well not have done it. He might as well have left them in Turkey. Is that what you're saying?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: Well, that's my main question I think. Before I mention this other theory, let me ask - did you have any further thoughts on what we talked about yesterday? Did you think about it last night or anything? On the general proposition, I was saying about the - oh, I was going to say on the camouflage, I'll mention this one thing, something I was aware of when I did this study in '64 was

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that the Soviets had taken very good pains on secrecy in moving the missiles to Cuba. By the way, more than the civilians believed, more than the U.S. believed was possible, it amounted to this, the U.S. intelligence community assumed that a country like the Soviets or for that matter, ourselves, could not carry out a move without some break in communications intelligence, that we would have picked up something on communications. And the Soviets kept off the phone. They kept off the radio. They apparently did everything by courier, is that correct?

MIKOYAN: Absolutely, you are right.

DE: That was very disciplined and there was no break in ...

MIKOYAN: They even decided not to use any code and each message had to be given to either Castro or Khrushchev or to our ambassador, Alexei, only from hand to hand by people of honor. He did not believe in so much in these codes.

DE: When did you know that, that that was the case? Did your father tell you about the codes?

MIKOYAN: I think the first who told me about this was

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ambassador _____ when we came to our, I think so or my father up on the plane. But I found about it only after ...

DE: See, that had an implication. One reason that we had been relying that there were no Russian missiles in Cuba, in the USSR, was the absence of strong communications intelligence that there was. Cuba showed that they could have concealed those missiles in Cuba, in the USSR. There could have been a missile gap that we might have missed because of their ability to stay off the air.

MIKOYAN: But you only thought that too many ships were going there.

DE: Yes and they hadn't interpreted them rightly except for McCone. So McCone was suspicious. Then there is this peculiarity. Having done that, there was no attempt to camouflage whatever. As you say, the fences were put up.

MBG: It's a mystery, isn't it?

MIKOYAN: Unexplainable and this can only be explained by Russian disorder and absence of discipline. From the decision in the Politburo up to the appearing of those two

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on the island, nobody knew. After that they just forgot
about camouflage. No explanation. I asked Alexei, the
ambassador. He said, this was the responsibility of the
engineers who built it. And they did not think it was
necessary or they did think about it. They work like they
work here. Amazing.

DE: Well see, there's another part of it too. The Soviets
and Castro knows when the U2 is flying. They know when
it's flying because of their radar. And they know what the
U2 can do basically. After all they had a U2 in 1960. I
think they had the cameras. I'm not certain of this but I
think they got the cameras and were able to tell what it
could accomplish, no?

MIKOYAN: Anyway, they talked with Anderson, he was the
pilot and ...

DE: Powers, Powers. Anderson was killed. So they knew it
was flying over. They knew it could fly any time. And,
so, they would have to assume, it would seem that the U2
could spot those things. So, it would seem that on the
intelligence side, it's just hard to believe that somebody
wouldn't plan to do it. Now, there's two possibilities
that are not often considered: one, I'll just mention, but

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I think it's wrong, one would be that they figured that as soon as the missiles were present they would be sufficiently deterrent. There was no danger of attack, once they had gotten there. Obviously, and let me ask you this, my impression is that the reason they did not announce they were sending the missiles was fear of a blockade. And I think, contrary to Sorenson, you know Sorenson said, - well, if you had announced that there would have been no problem.

MIKOYAN: I agree with you. In case we announce, you would announce the blockade.

DE: Let me say, my best judgment would be that it's not open and shut, black and white. If we had announced, you might have gotten away with it but you might not, definitely not. It would be hard to say. When Sorenson says, we couldn't have blockaded. That's silly. Of course, there was a high chance of a blockade. But I wouldn't say there was a certainty of a blockade. You might have gotten away with it in that case and kept the missiles there. I'd say there was a chance. I wouldn't dismiss that. But, there was a strong reason not to do it though, I agree with that. The risk of a blockade was significant. Now, having said that you've already

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considered the risk of a blockade, what about the risk then of an air strike or a blockade once you see some missiles there? One theory would be, that once the missiles are there, they're very presence is deterrent. That shows the Soviets are committed. Maybe some are operational, even though these aren't. It might be enough of an deterrent. And so the Soviets would think, that we're safe, we're home free once we get them there. We don't have to camouflage. But, I don't think that's the case. I'd suspect that's not the case. My theory of yesterday could cover this. There are three possibilities: one is just sheer incompetence, but the incompetence is very great on this point. And so it's a peculiar explanation. The third explanation I'm giving is, the third possibility I'm giving, is this, a combination of incompetence, partly part of the reason but also the feeling that, - I said yesterday - if Kennedy sees them but we don't announce them, Kennedy will not want to announce them before the election. The timing will protect them. The fact that it's before the election will protect them because he will not want the Republicans on his back. He will not want to be forced into a crises, if he can keep it secret. And we'll let him keep it secret. So the point here would be, - we keep it secret earlier because that's too far before the election. This would be, maybe too sophisticated for them. The idea would be, he'll keep it

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secret for those last few weeks before the election while we're building them because he won't want to announce it. So we don't have to disguise it. Kennedy will know but he will keep the secret. What I think is this, it's a combination of _____. I think they meant to keep it secret as much as they could and incompetence of some kind kept them from achieving that. They did not keep it as secret as they could. But that they did insure against a real risk that he wouldn't find out by timing it in such a way, before the election, as to give Kennedy an incentive to keep quiet about it in addition to the threats they were making about Berlin and so forth. They were trying to maximize Kennedy's incentive to keep silent if he should discover, that would be my thought now.

MIKOYAN: I agree because some participants even said that there was a camouflage.

DE: At the time or later?

MIKOYAN: At the time.

DE: At the time they said it was camouflaged?

MIKOYAN: No, no, in our meetings.

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DE: In your meetings, yeah.

MIKOYAN: No, no, we did it. Americans said, no.

DE: What level of participants said that?

MIKOYAN: Well, I don't remember. I shall ask ...

[TALKING TOGETHER].

MIKOYAN: ... maybe also they thought that since our engineers and builders were just not in the uniforms but with clothes. Perhaps they thought that it looked like construction of a farm. Perhaps they did not guess that the structure was just the same as ...

DE: It was they call a signature. Do you know that phrase, that term? It's like a finger-print. But they call it a signature, you know, a very personal signature. And what photo interpreters say, certain things have signatures, meaning there are little indicators that point absolutely and show absolutely what you're looking at. The archetype of a signature is a double barbed-wire fence. The Soviets put a double barbed-wire fence around all their nuclear

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installations. So when you see a double barbed-wire fence, you're looking at a nuclear installation. It's a signature. It's as though they signed it.

MIKOYAN: So the layout of the building.

DE: Maybe that was just a failure. Let me give you my major theory now, which is new, as to what Kennedy was really doing or how this really worked together. I'll try to do it briefly without arguing it because the argument takes too long as to why I think that or why it's better than some other theory. I think Kennedy wanted personally to have the option in his hands, secretly of an attack on military installations in Cuba before he learned of the missiles. He wanted all readiness for that possibility, to say that that planning in early October was quote - normal contingency planning, because he hadn't made a decision yet, is like saying that the planning on October 27th was normal contingency planning. He hadn't made a decision yet, as far as I know, but would Bundy say that was normal contingency planning? Well, I think the planning in October 1st was of the same category, not quite as intense of course, but very similar, was not normal contingency planning, it was very serious planning, which doesn't mean he had definitely decided but it means that he wanted to be

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ready to do it. Moreover, I'll even add a detail, I think the CIA was preparing and DIA and the Navy were preparing to provoke a Cuban attack on a destroyer if possible, as we discussed the other day. He finds the missiles. I'll just give it in a summary form now. Here's what I think probably, - now, you'll recognize how different this is from the usual account. I'm going to give a very different account of what I think really happened. They find the missiles there on the 16th and Kennedy's first reaction,

✓ I'll add this wrinkle, there was a report in one story that he asked McGeorge Bundy whether this could be kept secret till the election, that that was the first thing he asked McGeorge Bundy. McGeorge Bundy denies that but did admit he was interested in how long we could keep this secret so we could prepare our response. Let me make a judgment there, Kennedy said - can we keep this secret till the election? By the way, I happen to know Kennedy had a special secrecy in process here of unprecedented nature, never before or since, whose only purpose could have been to keep this secret till the election, if the information should come in. It was absolutely unprecedented degree of secrecy on this stuff, before the missiles were found, before they were found.

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MIKOYAN: Before?

DE: Before they were found, yeah. So I think he was preparing, in case the missiles in, if possible keep it secret till the election. But he asked Bundy, - can we do it now? And Bundy would have to say, - no, it's impossible.

MIKOYAN: Do you think that Kennedy wanted to postpone the strike from Cuba until after the election?

DE: Oh no, I'm saying that he wanted to keep a freedom of action, is what I'm really saying. He wanted to be able to hit but he wanted to be able not to be forced to hit. He wanted to be able to choose on that point. So he was being pressed to hit, remember, without knowledge of the missiles. And he might want to do it even without the missiles. But he might not want to do it, even if there were missiles. He wanted that degree of freedom, which was unrealistic though. If they had gotten the information a day or two before the election, they could have kept it secret. But a week - not really, not this information, not more than a week. That's what Bundy told me. ^{JFK} So then, - what to do? The second point, Kennedy may have for a matter of hours said, - well, then we're going to have to

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hit them. That's the attitude he expresses at the first meeting, though I don't assume that that's what he really meant to do. Let me go further. I think that the major purpose of the Excom(?) meetings, like 100 percent, was to manage his political problem, vis-a-vis, his own Administration which included Republicans and hawks who were direct channels to the Republicans in Congress. To be specific, I now believe that the Excom was largely to assure that Dillon was aboard whenever they did, the had Dillon's agreement with whatever they did. And that Dillon and others would not accuse him.

MIKOYAN: Who was ...?

DE: Dillon was a major Republican; He had earlier been Secretary of the Treasury, he had been an ambassador to France.

MIKOYAN: Dillon, oh, yes, of course. Dillon, yes. I met him _____ years ago.

DE: No, Dillon thinks this was a marvelous experience. It was the most interesting time of his life. It was tremendous decision making. Everybody changed their minds. And my opinion is, that the whole purpose of that exercise

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was to leave Dillon with that exact impression.

[BACKGROUND LAUGHTER] It was an elaborate time of the Excom, which is not unusual. Also, John McCone, also the Joint Chiefs and several others.

MBG: That's great.

DE: But the real decision was being made, as usual, in the place where it would normally expected to be made, between the President and the Secretary of Defense and whatever political advisors ...

MIKOYAN: And his brother.

DE: And his brother, yeah, the President, his brother and McNamara. I mean you can't make it without McNamara and he trusted McNamara anyway but not on the political aspects. Then, McNamara, I believe, from the very moment of this thing was determined to avoid a strike, if possible. And I believe the President was clear on that, at least by the second day, if not by the first day. But that McNamara was clear on that from the beginning. There must not be an attack and there must not be an invasion now that the missiles are there, because, as McNamara said, - within hours, they had been told by CIA, - at this point we can't

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assure you that they're not operational already. They might be operational already. And McNamara - unlike some other people we might have, I wouldn't want to trust Weinberger or Bush, I don't know who would make the same judgment - but McNamara was very clear, - I don't want to take a chance on a Soviet major or lieutenant firing that missile if we attack it. So, from McNamara's point of view and I believe the President's, from the second day or so - in their minds, attack was out. This does not mean there would have been no attack. I just mean, they felt subjectively determined. They did not want an attack. That doesn't mean that there would have been no attack in the end. You might ask Gorbachev, if he wants to invade Azerbaijan, you know, a month ago? No, absolutely not. But events take over. In the end he finds himself doing it. It's like that, is what I'm saying. I don't know about Gorbachev but I'm saying in Kennedy's case, I believe they were quite clear. They did not want to attack.

MIKOYAN: Why?

DE: Two things; till that moment, before the missiles appeared - I believe they wanted to be ready to attack, to be able to attack, they might attack. So, if you ask Kennedy, - what are the odds? If his brother said, - Jack,

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what are the odds that we'll attack this before the election? I think he would have given an answer - he would say one in ten, one in two, one in three, something like that. Maybe we will, maybe we won't. But from the time the missiles appeared, the odds go down to almost zero. I'm not going to attack Russian IRBMS.

MIKOYAN: Because they understood the degree of our commitment?

DE: Yes and no, no not so much. That wouldn't be enough. But the two things were these, I think. First, what did come out of the Harvard meetings, before Moscow is - how seriously McNamara took the possibility of an unauthorized action. Not that Khrushchev would fire those missiles but that some subordinate officer would fire the missiles. This by the way - he really felt, he said, - I can't say if the chances is one in a hundred or one in a thousand. It's small. But I don't want it.

MIKOYAN: He had a phrase - you can also find a scoundrel who would not listen to the command or who would not have an order or make some mistake.

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DE: There is American military phrase. It's often quoted without realizing that it's a traditional phrase which is, - there's always some son of a bitch who doesn't get the word. Is that the phrase?

MIKOYAN: Yes. He used this phrase in connection with that plane or our

DE: Kennedy said that. Now, Kennedy didn't invent that expression.

MIKOYAN: And so he could say it also about son of bitch of Russian officers in Cuba.

DE: Right, exactly. By the way, interestingly, it did not occur to anybody that that is what happened with the SAM. They assumed Khrushchev fired that. That's what did happen.

MIKOYAN: Exactly the case, so if you ask ^{Volkogonov} Bokovonov(?) he would say, - no, in no case they could do so without a direct order from Khrushchev.

DE: He said that about the SAM?

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MIKOYAN: No, about the missiles. And if you ask Sergei Khrushchev he also, no only with the, officially yes, yes. But that SAM officer, he did it without any command.

✓
DE: Yes, that's right. By the way, you were in Moscow, there was further word, was there not, they concluded that - I think the current belief in the Harvard article that Blight(?) wrote about Moscow, have you seen that? Have you seen the write-up in International Security magazine? He says, that they no longer think that, that guy you mentioned who died, Statzenko(?), they no longer think that Statzenko(?) did order it. Did you hear that?

MIKOYAN: No.

DE: It was somebody else that did.

MIKOYAN: Two other men, Statzenko(?) told me that ...

DE: He did it.

MIKOYAN: ... it was him. But then, there were some other people, two people who are still alive and they're explanation was, that we see, we, the whole atmosphere was that we will fight together with Cubans, that we will not

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give up. So I wouldn't object that in case of a strike, one of those missiles, at least, could shoot or even maybe all of them because the atmosphere, the conscience of the army which was there, was to fight not to give up.

MBG: Who are those two who are still alive?

DE: Do you know the names?

MIKOYAN: Not now but because it's mentioned. They did not come to the conference.

DE: By the way since Vok¹⁰aganov(?) knows that and knows about the SAM, why would he continue to say this about the missiles, that the missiles could not have been fired.

MIKOYAN: Well, he would like to stress the discipline in our army and that our Politburo was responsible at that time and they wouldn't do an escalation and they wouldn't do an first strike.

DE: Well most military would say that to a civilian.

MIKOYAN: And perhaps, excuse me, and perhaps there was an order to shoot only with the permission of Moscow, maybe.

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DE: I take it that was not true in the SAM case. After all, they hadn't made a specific order like that. As I recall, you go one step further both to me and in the meeting and also Sergei Khrushchev and say, you don't exclude that under attack, even Khrushchev himself might have ordered, right?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: Okay, now I think that McNamara thought ...

MIKOYAN: He also not excluded.

DE: Now, McNamara did not fear that but others did. For example, Rusk mentioned that he feared that, let's just say. So that's the first point, they was nuclear deterrence, just what Khrushchev wanted was achieved by the presence of those missiles. I believe, in fact, he turned the prospect of invasions from a 50/50 kind of chance to a very low chance. Or, in the mind of Kennedy, to a zero but not really, objectively not to zero but somewhat lower. So he did achieve some deterrence. Now, it goes on from there. What then was Kennedy strategy? I think, since he now ruled out attack, and that was the only way they

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figured unilaterally to get the missiles out, the blockade couldn't do it because they were already there. I believe, on the basis of a lot of evidence, but not totally conclusive, but strong circumstantial evidence, that this was his strategy from about October 17th on, which is: first, we blockade with the possibility of strengthening the blockade later to include oil, which after all, would be pretty strong. Over time, you could even get the missiles out that way, if you strangled Cuba, but it would take a long time and that would be politically bad for Kennedy. So I don't think he expected that, but he had a threat of an oil blockade. I even discussed that myself at the time.

MIKOYAN: Oil blockade from the ...

DE: Around Cuba, cut off oil. I participated in a discussion of how long it would take before Cuba was brought to its knees and _____.

MIKOYAN: Years.

DE: Well, they're supplies would be out shorter than that.

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MIKOYAN: Analysts often under estimate the opportunities of the opposite country.

DE: You mean whether they would be brought to their knees or whether they would be out of oil?

MIKOYAN: To drop and say everything _____.

DE: I didn't know anybody who thought that Cuba would do that. No, the more practical question was - how soon will they be out of oil? What are their supplies of oil? I think the answer was - six weeks, but six weeks that was too long, six months, they said in six months.

MIKOYAN: But after six months they would be still under Americans and _____ and will live with [TALKING TOGETHER].

DE: The only reason that was taken seriously was that Walt Rostow having been a targeteer during the Second World War, picked targets for bombing. And having concluded that the great missed opportunity of World War II was to go after oil very early. For 20 years now, he had been waiting for the chance to cut off somebody's oil. That was the dream of his life was to cut off somebody's oil. Every time something came up he would say, - go get that oil. I'll

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tell you what happened, I said to Rusk, I was sitting there with this CIA guy, I was debriefing him. And he said, -
[INTERRUPTION - WOMAN SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN TALKING TO MIKOYAN] -

MBG: ... look publicly like a pawn by this announcement of an even trade-off. Okay, you take away your Turkish missiles, we'll take away these. I never had thought of it like that, that Khrushchev would be so aware of Castro's negative feelings at such a move as to make public that kind of a trade-off. Simply _____ to humiliate him, that's all I'm saying. No?

DE: No, yes and no. Castro was humiliated and furious because Khrushchev did propose the trade publicly on Saturday morning. He was furious that he hadn't been consulted and that he had been _____. So the deal wasn't consummated. But Khrushchev already had kicked him in the balls by doing that and that was on reason he was so furious and ready to fight. But what he's saying there afterwards is, Castro's reaction would have alerted Khrushchev, let's say, to avoid trying to make a point of that thing because it would just further exacerbate _____. But he wasn't sensitive to begin with.

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MBG: No, okay, then that corrects initial _____. What I was going to say, I'm sure this is very clear to you from your experience, but the underlings are always in the same position that they mustn't be humiliated.

DE: Actually he said, Rostrow said, it will be like a clock ticking, an alarm ticking with this blockade because minute by minute, _____ is running out, time is running out. He's running out of oil. And I said, - just when does the alarm go off on this clock? So the guy says, six months. I said, - thanks a lot. Here, we're plotting from hour to hour on this thing. [TAPE CUT]. ... four years later, probably Rostow's major push was in '66 to hit the POL, hit the petroleum targets in the mine. It turned out it had no effect on them as far as you can see. It turned out that they had seen this coming, knowing that Rostow was there and they had totally decentralized. They had underground storage tanks all over the _____ for their oil so it didn't affect them

MBG: ... should be that [INAUDIBLE] ... would not regard this simply as an aside and a joke, so would say, oh, this guy whose talking [TAPE CUT] ... had a long history of _____ and this was his big chance, he thought. [TAPE CUT].

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DE: Let me try to give you, fast, where I think this goes.
Melville, [TAPE CUT].

[MIKOYAN ON TELEPHONE SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN FROM INTERRUPTION
TO END OF THIS SIDE A OF TAPE].

[END OF SIDE A].

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MBG: ... it would be wonderful if we should have a car.
They can't give us a car.

DE: Could we get a car, that would be good. So, if they
could take us to the hotel, then could come back.

MIKOYAN: It will take you to the hotel ...

MBG: Oh, I meant to the airport.

MIKOYAN: ... and then it will come at 5 ...

DE: And take us to the airport.

MIKOYAN: Take you to the airport.

MBG: Fantastic, would be marvelous.

MIKOYAN: This is the country where everything is possible
and ...

MBG: And nothing is possible.

MIKOYAN: We used to say, not now, but we used to say that
everything is forbidden here but everything is possible.

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MBG: And on the other hand, everything is impossible until somebody says, it is possible. Anyway, so go ahead.

DE: Okay, so here's what I think Kennedy had in mind. I'll just mention it fast. I believe Kennedy's strategy in the missile crises was to take a strong posture on the blockade thereby showing his Republican critics that he was capable of being tough. He was taking a strong position, holding out the possibility of an air-strike, getting ready for an air-strike. I believe that his full expectation was that he was going to have to get the missiles out of there by trading at least the Turkish missiles and possibly have to do more. His hope was that he wouldn't have to deal on Berlin. But he considered the possibility that in the end, he would deal on Berlin. But he might have to deal on Turkey, Turkey, Italy, Britain, all the IRBMs and possibly other concessions as well. He was going to bargain his way out. [INTERRUPTION]. [TAPE CUT]. ... I'll do a very fast version of it. Are you with me or not?

MIKOYAN: Yes, yes, I am with you.

DE: I think the Kennedy strategy was and the Kennedy, McNamara strategy in the first week of the crises, right

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away and up until the 27th of October, from the 16 to the
____, they're strategy was, - we will blockade. We will
threaten an air-strike and, when the time comes, at a
certain point, we will get the missiles out by a deal that
will involved at least the Turkish missiles and probably,
perhaps some others as well, other missiles, other
concessions of some sort. But as McNamara said, - we'll
never get out for less than the Turkish missiles. And they
were prepared to give the Turkish missiles from the
beginning. Now, why the blockade and the threat of the
air-strike? And the answer - for two reasons, because he
had to do something. He couldn't just negotiate. He had
to do something to repair this humiliation that had just
been inflicted on him and to satisfy the right-wing, he
really, I think, wanted to scare the country up to a point
so they would be willing to accept a deal rather than
invasion. Let them sweat, let the country sweat for a
while, including the right-wing, so they'll look this in
the eye and see whether they really want to invade all that
much. That's one point, including the allies.

[INTERRUPTION].

MBG: These are difficult problems for a secretary.

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DE: Okay, the second reason is for the blockade is to lower the price so that Khrushchev will not get too ambitious on what he demands for these missiles. The main thing was to keep him off Berlin. You mentioned earlier why they gave up the attack early. I mentioned first, the deterrence of the missiles, second ...

MIKOYAN: But in the beginning the missiles were not yet ready.

DE: McNamara made clear during the Harvard meeting, he said, - we didn't know that. He said, - CIA could not assure us that they were not operational, from the beginning, which was true. And he said, - that was enough, the mere chance that they were operational was enough for me.

MIKOYAN: Even one of three.

DE: They were deterrent to McNamara. That doesn't mean historically they would have been equally deterrent to every Secretary of Defense or every President but they did deter this pair of people who were more dovish than anybody else we've had probably, except maybe Carter. The other point though was that both Kennedy and McNamara, from the

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very beginning believed that if they now moved with the Russian commitment, if they now moved on Cuba, they would be hit on Berlin. And I think there, those earlier warnings had their effect, putting that very much into their minds.

MIKOYAN: I see, Berlin, Berlin.

DE: Berlin, Berlin, Berlin. So Kennedy was _____ on that, he said, - they will hit Berlin. That's it.

MIKOYAN: I think it would have been a continuation, an escalation.

DE: There would have been some escalation, do you think it would have been Berlin or elsewhere?

MIKOYAN: I think in Berlin, maybe in Turkey.

MBG: Who wants to escalate in Turkey?

MIKOYAN: All the Armenians, ... not enough for the Kremlin.

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DE: You asked the wrong man there, who wants to hit Turkey.

MIKOYAN: I would like to have that mount but ...

DE: Is your mother Armenian or just your father?

MIKOYAN: Both.

MBG: Mt. _____ is not worth it, as beautiful as it is.

DE: Were you raised religiously or not?

MIKOYAN: No, well I was in the religious of Communist.

DE: So, that again, was the other reason. They didn't want to do it. By the way, there was third thing. They also felt that if they hit the missiles, the Soviets would hit the missiles in Turkey. You didn't mention that. You just said Turkey in general. You don't think they would have hit the missiles in Turkey or considered it?

MIKOYAN: Well, even if they did it. It would have been considered, not enough.

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DE: Yeah, right, okay. But McNamara was now also worried about unauthorized action in Turkey. I'll just mention this very fast. The secret to what Kennedy had ordered but was not carried out, was that on the Saturday before he made his speech, he ordered the warheads removed from the missiles in Turkey.

MIKOYAN: Removed?

DE: Removed, so that there was no chance of an unauthorized action.

MIKOYAN: By some American officer.

DE: Yes, and that was not carried out.

MIKOYAN: Not carried out?

DE: It just didn't happen.

MIKOYAN: In spite of his order?

DE: Yes because he ...

MIKOYAN: Intentionally or just ...

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DE: Again, I think they felt, it's not, we can't really do it. It's too big of a fight. That's what he was very mad about. I found a document, that was what he was very angry about.

MBG: You found a document!

DE: It was not that he had ordered the missiles removed and it hadn't been carried out, it was that he had ordered the warhead removed and that had not been carried out. We supposedly, control the warheads. They owned the missiles. When you talk about removing the missiles, in theory, they owned the missiles, they were Turkish missiles. Just like, supposedly, I don't know if this is true or not but the IL28s(?) were said to be owned by Cuba.

MIKOYAN: Yes, owned by them.

DE: Russians said, - how can we take them out? They belong to Castro now. Same way with the missiles. Do you know when the ceremony was inaugurating the first operational status of those missiles? You don't know. October 22nd, 1962.

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MIKOYAN: But this was to take them out.

DE: No, they became operational by chance on October
²²~~27th~~, (?) in Turkish hands.

MBG: 22nd you said, right?

DE: I'm sorry, they were turned over to the Turks, I
should say. They were turned over to the Turks. Some had
become operational earlier but in U.S. hands. They were
turned over to the Turks on October ~~27~~2nd.

MIKOYAN: And all this, in spite of the talk in Washington
about removing them.

DE: And as I told you, that had never been raised with the
Turks, never been raised.

MIKOYAN: Now I understand that contradiction because I
couldn't understand it. I asked them, by the way, McNamara
and others, they couldn't answer me. They failed to
answer.

DE: They couldn't remember all this. It would seem that
the U.S. side was very confused on this story. At the

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time, and ever since, there's a guy named - if you're interested in this, a man named Phil Nash, a graduate student, wrote a very detailed paper on this, going through all the records. It sorts it out very clearly.

MIKOYAN: Is it new?

DE: Yes, it's a new paper. It hasn't been published yet. And it makes clear that, to this day, the Americans have been very confused in their minds about the status of that stuff. Now, they're going to make a trade at the last minute, at which point, the public will be heave a sigh of relief because they've been looking down the barrel of war for a week, by that time. Khrushchev will make a reasonable trade because he doesn't want war. He's been thinking about it too long. He's been losing sleep over it presumably. So everybody will want a deal. And at that point they will make a deal and Kennedy was absolutely clear that he was ready to deal away the Turkish missiles. So, on Saturday, the word comes from Khrushchev, let's make a deal on missiles. We now know that Bobby Kennedy had suggested that to Drobynin, so it was no big surprise to Kennedy. That explains why the President in the transcript immediately wants to accept that deal. He says, - it's a good deal. What's the problem with it? Let's do it.

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MIKOYAN: Yes but Excom now, he says, we must talk with
the Turks, ... NATO also,

DE: At this point, he's been running this Excon(?) for two weeks as a big show, making the decisions with McNamara and Bobby Kennedy behind the scenes and so on similarly. At this point the bureaucrats all say and McGeorge Bundy is in on a lot of it, but not all. He's not in the politics of it. But, at this point, they all get horrified, horrified. So they say, you can't do that, you can't do that and so forth. The President argues all day and here's what happens, I would say, - what we see in the transcripts plus what we know of Bobby Kennedy is as follows: This is my interpretation, now the next point is subject ...

MBG: Kennedy and McNamara alone or you said another person?

DE: Oh, I said Sorenson is on some and Bobby Kennedy, Bundy is not in on all of it. For example, Bundy did not know about Bobby Kennedy's talk to Dobrynin. There was a lot that McGeorge Bundy did not know.

MIKOYAN: So, he was not in the ...

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DE: I don't think anybody was in on all of it unless Bobby Kennedy. You see, I think that he shared some parts of this with one person and some parts with another. There are certainly parts here

MIKOYAN: But who took the decisions?

DE: Kennedy.

MIKOYAN: John, Bobby?

DE: John, definitely took the decisions. My impression
[MIKOYAN INAUDIBLE TALKING IN BACKGROUND]

MIKOYAN: Rusk or no?

DE: Rusk again, in part, Rusk may have been more in on this than anybody else realizes. He may or may not.

MIKOYAN: He was not so friendly with John.

DE: There's a lot of word that doesn't show up in the transcripts but a lot of people say, Rusk was scared shitless during this and was not easy to deal with, that he

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was sort of out of touch during the crises, he was so afraid. Others deny that but some people have definitely have said that.

MIKOYAN: And McNamara?

DE: No, McNamara was very together through it all. McNamara himself says, that he was very afraid.

MIKOYAN: But did he participate in the ...

DE: Oh yeah, I think McNamara was in very much on the inner decision making.

MIKOYAN: So, both of Kennedy and McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk.

DE: Yeah, now at the last moment then, on the 27th, I'll show you how it worked. On the 27th ...

MIKOYAN: It's not too important.

DE: Well, it's important but I'll come back to it. On Saturday, the 27th, what goes wrong here is that the Excom(?) is very unhappy about the idea of accepting this

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1987 deal which Kennedy has secretly set up with Turkey. So, he appears to back away from the deal. My conjecture, very strongly, is, then, that what he does is to postpone it by one day. He says, - alright, we'll take one last crack at seeing if we can get a better deal, namely a private deal, if we can make a private trade. He and Bobby have all testified, they did not expect this to succeed but give it a try. And I think what his plan was, was to give it a try for one day. At the same time, he's telling Rusk, set it up with ^{Cordier} Cordieay(?) so ^{U Thant} Utante(?) will ask me to make this deal by tomorrow[?] if necessary. So I think he wanted to be ready by the next day to make his deal. But instead of making the deal on Saturday, he decides, we'll hang tough for one more day. I infer, by the way, from this, that if Khrushchev had, in fact, delayed, temporized for one more day, he would have gotten himself a public deal on Turkey. The deal that he thought Kennedy was offering him, he would have gotten, namely on Saturday.

MIKOYAN: This was not so desperately necessary.

DE: A public deal would have made a lot of difference, I would say, because of the public deal, Castro wouldn't have been happy. Castro would have been unhappy. But I would say that a major purpose, underlying this, the missiles in

Turkey, Berlin, the strategic balance, everything was - are we your equals or not? Are we in parity or not? And a public deal would at last have said that we're equal. If we, the U.S. are allowed to have missiles in Turkey, you're allowed to have missiles in Cuba. If you're not allowed to have missiles in Cuba, we accept that we're no longer allowed to have missiles in Turkey, that's the difference. The U.S. position from start to finish on this and this is what McGeorge Bundy was explaining, the status quo is the status quo of asymmetry. It's an asymmetry of power and an asymmetry of legitimacy. We are the good guys and we are stronger. And on both counts we're allowed to have missiles on your border, you are not allowed to have missiles on our border. That's the way it is. And to move away from that is a real change. First it signals a change in the world balance of power. Presumably, we're not saying, - you have become good guys, so we are admitting that even though you're not good guys, the power is not ~~unequal, is equal(?)~~ ____ so we have to accept equality. And that would have had implications all around the world very quickly. It would have told the world that we're now going to treat you on an equal basis. And of course, you would have also gotten a no invasion pledge in addition. That was part of the deal. Kennedy was prepared to give that. So, he gets the no invasion pledge but he also gets, - we

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now treat you as our equal. And that is precisely what the cold warriors on the Excom correctly perceived was a horrible change in the international status quo, as far as they were concerned. There was an irony here which was this. Here's a wrinkle. Kennedy, McNamara, and Bundy were three people who believed that the status quo of power had changed already, that they really were equal, even though we had more missiles. But that the balance didn't make that much difference. So, from the very beginning, they were ready to say, - sooner or later we're going to have to admit that, for practical purposes, the balance is equal and we'll have to deal on that basis. And they were willing to do that. He hawks, in general, were people who said, - bullshit. We're not equal at all. And we don't have to accept it. So that people like Nitza(?), you know from NC 40, 68, and so forth, whose whole policy was based on, - we must keep superiority as long as we can. Their position and Dillon's was, - we still are superior and we don't have to concede any of this stuff. And if you do, it's because you're cowardly. You're a coward if you say, we're basically equal when we're not basically equal. So, I think that what happened here was, McGeorge Bundy, on this point yielded to the others and they all say, we can't make that public trade yet. They weren't in on it. The President is very frustrated. He says, - alright, I'll do

to himself

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REF?

it tomorrow. And he tells Rusk but he doesn't tell anyone. He didn't tell Bundy. As far as we know, he didn't tell McNamara. He says, - you get ready to do this through ^{U. Thant} Utant(?). Why does he choose Rusk on this? 'Cause Rusk was the most dovish of all these guys.

MIKOYAN: Most?

DE: Dovish.

MBG: Dovish.

And he
really
knew
the
balance?

DE: The most scared, Rusk said, he was happy to wake up the morning after the speech. He was afraid that Khrushchev would fire the missiles after the Kennedy speech. Now, that's pretty nervous.

MBG: This is great stuff.

DE: That we have a situation where Khrushchev obviously can conceive of simply giving in because that's what he does, at least that's what he does do the next day on ^{Sunday} Saturday. The President is quite willing to make a deal on Turkey and he's ready to do it the next day but each of them put off this resolution for another day, on Saturday.

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Khrushchev waits to see whether he will get a public deal and Kennedy waits to see if he can get away without a public deal. And while they're waiting Castro is firing at low level reconnaissance planes. [LAUGHTER]. They have both put this unwittingly in the hands of Castro ...

MBG: This is called control in a military situation.

DE: ... who is the youngest of them and who is under direct attack, and who has been the most humiliated of anybody during this whole week and is furious. So, if Castro's gunner managed to shoot down one of these planes, then, that is not the time when Kennedy can make a fast deal. He's got to do something violent. And it may be that he would limit that to the maximum and then deal or it might not. I would say that the risk that both sides were taking was, that an escalation would get started and they might not have been able to stop it. I don't think that would have led to all out war, probably, but it could have gotten very big. But instead, Khrushchev who has learned that his SAM has been fired without his desire, which could happen again any minute, if that happens once how can he be sure it won't happen again, right? He can give new orders but he can't be sure that they will be obeyed. And he knows that Castro may shoot down a low flying plane and

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that Kennedy has warned him that if that happens, we're going to hit the missiles. That's the end of the story.

MIKOYAN: Excuse me, I heard a proposal to continue our talk on our way to the airport.

DE: Okay, well we could do that.

MIKOYAN: Because I have almost no time to ... [TAPE CUT].

MBG: ... and you know, I have the impression, which could be altogether wrong, that maybe the Soviets participating were believing him ...

MIKOYAN: Well, I must confess that I did. And when I came to _____ in '87, I think, and McNamara said that we had no intention to invade. I answered and I declared in the _____ for all the audience, that until that very moment I did not think so but I respect this man and I have to believe him. So, only now, I believe it but we had all the grounds to know that the invasion was imminent. This is what I said. And then, he said, - if I were in the Kremlin I would also thought that the invasion was imminent because of Mongoose Operation.

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DE: Reading what you actually said, my memory is, when I read it very carefully, that you might be saying something like, I begin to believe it or as if I might believe, begin to believe it, didn't you? I mean I wondered what you meant there.

✓ MIKOYAN: Yes, in my article in The New Times, I use this expression. I begin to ...

DE: But are you telling us that you did believe it actually, more than I've suggested?

MIKOYAN: Well, I began to believe it but then when I asked Gartov(?) about the plan, which did exist and I know it did. He said, - Whoa, we had plans of attacking _____.
So they have all kinds of plans.

DE: But he has increasingly backed away from that.

MIKOYAN: I asked about _____. He said, well, yes, it's a peace(?) move but still there was no political intention to invade. There was a wish on the part of Pentagon but ...

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MBG: Contingency plan, yes. Because, you know, Sergo, I must confess to you that I felt, - how can these intelligent, sophisticated Soviets believe these people? How can they believe them, you know?

MIKOYAN: Well, I always thought that after so many years passed, why McNamara should lie now, why he couldn't confess that, yes, we had such plans. I was not for that plans but there were other people who thought that it was necessary.

DE: Strictly speaking, McNamara, to this day, remember he has not been willing to discuss Vietnam at all. He thinks of himself so much as a dove, that he's not willing to give new information about any aggressive design he was ever part of. He doesn't give a lot of information out. And, of the information he's put out, it's all on the way of showing how prudent he was, how conservative he was, how cautious he was. He never is willing to reveal anything that suggests that he was part of any aggressive design at all.

MBG: Dan, my question to you as a former assistant to McNamara ...

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MIKOYAN: but not only him but also Bundy.

MBG: do you think he is _____ now that he is lying
now.

DE: See, my assumption on this point was that on that planning, they had to be lying because I didn't believe they could forget that. But Gartov does believe, after talking to him, that he's genuinely has forgotten. By the way, I'm well aware that such people can forget very remarkable things because of the pressure of events on them. It comes at them, so fast and with such intensity that each day's events wipe out part of what happened yesterday. But still, I would have guessed that they would remember that. But Gartov feels that they didn't. But there's another side to it and that is, on the point about, when you say, after so many years, when you talk about Mongoose, you're talking about a highly secret covert operation. And strictly speaking, that never becomes declassified. These guys have never given out one piece of information about a covert operation. The information we have on it is 100 percent from other sources, from documents. They have confirmed some of it. They said, - yes, we did this and this and that and the Church Committee brought out the Mongoose, Church Committee, yeah. So,

V
Am MCH
on
(G to H...)
"MCH..."
the way he
wished it
had been."

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McNamara and Bundy, they never put out voluntarily, they never add to the information on Mongoose. They do nothing but deprecate it. They do nothing but say, oh, that was just a silly, little set of plans. We paid very little attention to that. It wasn't until I got the documents, a year ago, just a year ago, when they were released, that I realized that these documents say from the beginning, the objectives of Mongoose, this is from early '62 now, the objectives of Mongoose, which are to overthrow the Castro regime, cannot be met without a direct combat involvement. And Mongoose was not authorized to plan that direct involvement but it did say, - we cannot meet these aims without the involvement meaning - we can do things to rationalize the involvement. We can prepare for it. We can do the things that lead up to it but you are going to have to send troops, in a word, if you're going to overthrow Castro. So what I now see as the main purpose of Mongoose was, first of all, to be the framework for the getting all the rest of the OAS in line, for isolating Cuba, for establishing a basis for attacking Cuba and second to provide provocations that would be the trigger for the invasion. Either they would provoke Castro into doing something to which they could retaliate by invading or they would fake it some way, they would fake a Castro attack. And I think that was the whole operation in

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the end!

Nicaragua, that was what the Contras were for. The Contras, I'm now convinced, had basically one purpose, the Contra operation was a focus for getting Honduras and Guatemala and everybody on board, on isolating Nicaragua and being ready to attack. But second, the Contras were to either provoke the Nicaraguans into attacking Honduras or Costa Rica and provide an occasion to attack Nicaragua or the Contras would be the cover for faking attacks on an American ambassador, the embassy, this or that, which again would be taken as the excuse. In other words, I'm sure that the Pentagon understood, we don't get rid of the Sandinistas without invading. [TAPE CUT].

MIKOYAN: ... without party benefit, only for instance, majority of Politburo or Central Committee can tell them to restore order. This only theoretical opportunity.

DE: I have heard that, not that there was anything like a coup, but that Brezhnev did have the support of the army when he took over from Khrushchev.

MIKOYAN: Well, it was the only favor, just in case. See, every time, for instance, _____ and dismissal of Khrushchev were made in an orderly way by votes. So, there were only steps taken - just in case. In the story with

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_____, it was much more important than the position of the army, than with Khrushchev because Khrushchev could not ever ask army to be with him against the Party. It's impossible. It's as foolish as, for instance, to imagine maybe Reagan would call the army to permit him to stay for another four years. It's foolish. But in case with ^{Berri's} Berrier(?) this was important because he had to be arrested by whom? He could not be, perhaps, arrested by his own men.

DE: So, was he arrested by the army?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: Do they have the legal authority to make arrests?

MIKOYAN: Well, they were ordered by the Politburo.

MBG: And that gives you legal authority.

MIKOYAN: Well there is such institution as military court. By the way, ... because he was ...

DE: They say, come _____ to honor your many years of faithful service we have decided, the Politburo has decided

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to make you, to give you military rank. You are now made a marshall. Oh, that's very nice. You are now subject to the universal code of military justice and you are under arrest.

MIKOYAN: It has been done by Stalin. Especially in those times, it was absolutely insignificant because he was arrested by marshalls and then he was taken to the headquarters of the Moscow garrison.

MBG: A place to watch your step, particularly in those days. Watch your step or you'll fall into a Checheco(?) hole.

DE: Do you have any reaction now to this, if you recall, you were busy, to this interpretation I gave or speculation on the crises, on what Kennedy and McNamara were doing during the crises and how it came out. What I'm saying is that in one respect it was much safer than the public thought because McNamara and Kennedy really did not want or intend or expect to invade or to attack even though on Saturday they were moving very hard toward preparations but they did not want it, that was a bluff. I believe they were running a bluff but the bluff could have exploded. They could have carried out those plans. Nevertheless, if,

bluffing this on military + Right — "If the do this, I will under you..."

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in this case, if Castro had managed to shoot down some planes, one or more planes, they might have well found themselves, that their own bluff had created pressures on them to carry out an attack on those SAMS and perhaps the missiles.

MIKOYAN: As far as I know, even after _____ they decided to make a strike on Monday or if not on Monday maybe next day.

DE: But there's a very critical point there that has not really been recognized in the literature. When Bobby wrote his memoir or Sorenson wrote the memoirs, the following point is a little unclear but Bobby expressed it to me in 1964 very, very clearly that he had given two separate warnings to Dobrynin.

MIKOYAN: Two separate warnings.

DE: Two separate on this particular conversation.

MIKOYAN: If you don't take your missiles out, we shall do it ourselves.

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X

DE: Yes, that he said and he said he gave them a 40⁸ hour. He described that to me as 48 hour deadline. But there was a second point, he said that they would have to keep flying reconnaissance and that if another reconnaissance plane was shot down, they would attack immediately and at least the SAMS and probably the missiles and that would probably be followed by an invasion. So I said, later in the conversation I said, - so he was giving them 48 hours and he said, - unless, and then he corrected me, he said, - unless they shot a plane right away in which case we would do it right away. Now, that has never been made clear in the discussions. As I say, he made it clear to me.

MBG: [INAUDIBLE COMMENT].

DE: That was the 27th, the night of the 27th.

MBG: That's Saturday, right?

DE: Yeah.

MIKOYAN: _____ this was not mentioned during ours.

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DE: In what?

MIKOYAN: In our discussion.

DE: No, no. To me ...

MIKOYAN: And he told about it to you?

DE: Yes, he told me in 1964 personally, yes. As I say, with great emphasis there, so I'm quite sure of that point. And in his memoir he actually says, - I told him that we would have to keep flying the reconnaissance, something like that. And, I think that's all he says, that if one were shot down we would retaliate.

MIKOYAN: So that means that they could not be so patient because depends on ... I mean ...

DE: Oh no, see Kennedy had agreed earlier that if one were shot down, he would retaliate immediately. He backed off from that, when they shot down the U2. But it was very clear to them that they couldn't back off a second time. He could hold them back once. And frankly, as you know, there are these two different accounts, versions as to whether Bobby Kennedy had expressed the possibility, said,

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I can't hold back the military. Now, there's three possibilities; Some people think that Bobby said nothing like that and that and that Khrushchev who referred to that in his memoirs, just remembered that wrongly or made it up.

MIKOYAN: Maybe, maybe, because there are many mistakes in his memoirs.

DE: Another possibility, which I think is quite possible, is that Kennedy said something to the effect, the military want to attack, were having great trouble holding them back. We can't hold them back much longer from attacking. And, if another plane is shot down, we won't be able to hold it back. He could very well have said that. I think that's what they believed pretty much that they would have to do something. Either Dobrynin or Khrushchev could have interpreted that with some exaggeration as meaning that he was warning of a possible coup, when, in fact, Bobby had no such thought. He just meant, they will expect us to attack. We'll have to carry that out. We can't back down in front of the military. He might not have had a coup in mind. But Khrushchev might have thought he was warning him of a coup, possibly coup. The third possibility which is less likely, that's the most likely I think, - that Bobby

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did say, you know, you have drawn first blood, you have created a difficult situation here and you're making it very hard for us to settle this thing peacefully. I personally would not rule out the possibility that Bobby did talk of the possibility of a coup unless this was settled peacefully.

MIKOYAN: Why?

DE: Just because they say, that was the mood they were actually ...

MIKOYAN: [INAUDIBLE QUESTION].

DE: No, I say, it's unlikely. But not impossible, that Bobby, in fact, expressed some thought that, there's no record of this at all, there's nothing in the records. I'm just saying the military in fact were very strong on this point and Bobby and his brother did say they thought they would be impeached if he hadn't done anything. And I just think it's possible. But here's what I'm really saying, if Dobrynin said, but I understand he hasn't said this, if Dobrynin said, Khrushchev is right, Bobby did talk of a coup, I would not find that impossible to believe. If, on the other hand, Dobrynin said, no, no, he didn't say

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anything like that, I could believe that too, either way.
What does Dobrynin say on that point, do you know?

MIKOYAN: I think he did not confirm this phrase from his memoirs.

DE: I mean he rejected it or he said ...

MIKOYAN: No, it wasn't like that, no.

DE: Well, alright, I, I go by whatever ...

MIKOYAN: Anyway, I think that Bobby could have said it in order to ...

DE: To press, yeah to press.

MIKOYAN: ... interest, yes, because it meant that how you deal with us and tomorrow you could deal with the military.

DE: It's could be an exaggeration. I mean he could have said it in a mood to exaggerate what the situation was. I think, they were feeling that the situation was very dangerous. However, as I say, I think that Kennedy, was there a real risk in the crises, let me ask that question.

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- My answer to that would not be this. First of all, there's
- 1) no question, Khrushchev was taking more risk than he realized when he put those missiles there, that's clear.
 - 2) It is not the case that it was almost certain that those missiles would be struck unless Khrushchev backed down, that's what many Americans say. It was terribly risky because he was certain to have those missiles shot up unless he backed down. That's not the case. It wasn't as risky as they think, as they thought. Kennedy was prepared to back down. Kennedy was capable and was even expecting to back down and make a deal. And, I think, definitely.
 - 3)

MIKOYAN: Do you mean that he would have agreed to the missile _____.

- DE: No, he felt the missiles had to be out of Cuba but he was prepared to bargain them out, to pay whatever it took to get them out. He couldn't just leave them there for political reasons.
- 4)

MIKOYAN: Not _____.

DE: That's right, see, when people say, he couldn't leave them there, that was true politically. He accepted that. But what they didn't realize was, until really quite

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recently, they just didn't have the records. It was a lie
that Bobby said, he would never have bargained them out.
He would never have given away anything. That was just
false. He was prepared to bargain them out. They didn't
have to go [UNINTELLIGIBLE]. If he had traded Turkey or
whatever else it took to get them out and by that time
Khrushchev was scared and he had made the offer of Turkey.
He was willing to get them out for Turkey. If he had done
that, I think we would say, the world would have said, that
was a big victory for Khrushchev. I think your position
is, correct me if I'm wrong, that it was not a terrible
defeat for Khrushchev politically. Given that he got the
agreement on no invasion.

MIKOYAN: Inside our country?

DE: Yeah.

MIKOYAN: No.

DE: It was not. Would you say, even in the world, it was
not a big defeat or not?

MIKOYAN: In the world, before perestroika it was not as
important for us, for instance, invasion of Czechoslovakia

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or invasion of Afghanistan, internationally it wasn't catastrophic but domestically we pretended not to see it even.

DE: Okay, right. So, in that sense, it didn't matter. But, what I'm saying is, if he had gotten the missiles out of Turkey the world would have seen that very clearly as a victory for Khrushchev instead of what happened, as a victory for Kennedy. And, in fact I'm saying, although he didn't go in with that in mind, that wasn't his intention, the fact is, Khrushchev came quite close to achieving that I believe. To put it another way, it was not crazy for him, in my opinion, to believe that Kennedy would not attack the missiles. On the contrary, he was right about that. Kennedy did not want to attack the missiles. In that sense, his notion that the missiles would deter Kennedy, which most Americans take as crazy, was not only - not crazy, it was right, they did deter Kennedy. What, almost nobody realizes is, and by the way, I didn't realize it at the time, when I was working on it, that Kennedy was consciously running a bluff on those preparations, he was pressing Khrushchev, he was impressing his own right wing. He was satisfying his own military but he intended to settle this with a bargain, not with an attack. So, in

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*Others: attack is less bad
than a deal: better...*

JFK: no

(so, on VN; C-I; Wall; PTB)

that sense then, the crises was not nearly as dangerous as people thought.

MIKOYAN: But you told me that under the conditions which were by the end of this week, I understand so if not that letter the last letter to Khrushchev, we cannot exclude that in spite of his unwillingness.

DE: If Khrushchev had been unwilling to make a deal then he might have had to attack. So, he would have been willing to go beyond the Turkish missiles. For example, Khrushchev was saying nothing about the missiles in Italy but he certainly would have been willing to give up the missiles in Italy. They mentioned other things. Let's see. Alex Johnson, they had quite a list of things they might be willing to deal on. I'll tell you a big one. It was not at all excluded that Guantanamo would be given up.

McN

MIKOYAN: Guantanamo?

DE: Yeah, definitely not(?). Let me tell you something that has been greatly misinterpreted in that crises.

MIKOYAN: This would be very important. In this case, Fidel Castro maybe would even permit inspection.

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DE: Here's the thing. Guantanamo was of course mentioned by Adelai Stevenson, on Saturday, the 20th, two days before Kennedy's speech.

MIKOYAN: In talks with whom or in speech?

DE: He had mentioned it earlier but he then brought it up at the NSC(?) meeting on Saturday, the 20th that we should be prepared. Here's what he said. Stevenson's point was, - it's always been regarded that Kennedy dismissed that totally as an outrageous suggestion, as everybody did, that they should give up Guantanamo. Actually the difference between Kennedy and Stevenson was as follows and this is very clear in the record that's now come out, Stevenson's position before that meeting and during the meeting was, - that it was too provocative to blockade, the blockade was too dangerous to do without, he did not oppose the blockade in the end, he didn't like it but he accepted the blockade.

But he said, the blockade should be accompanied with an ^{explicit} ~~exclusive~~ mention of our willingness to negotiate. In other words, we're blockading but we're willing to talk. And he said, we should indicate right away not only that we were willing to talk but we should indicate the possible

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things we were willing to talk about which included, Turkey and Guantanamo. It was up for discussion.

MIKOYAN: This is in the Excom talk?

DE: Yeah, it's in the minutes of the meeting.

MIKOYAN: And what was the reaction of _____?

DE: Kennedy's reaction was precisely as follows - I do not agree that this is the right time to discuss that. He said, we must not discuss any of that till after the blockade is in place. Their disagreement was whether you should take a strong action without any explanation, make it as strong as possible to the U.S. domestic scene, to the Congressmen, to the Russians. And then when everybody has gotten worried after a few days, then we indicate, - we're ready to be reasonable and talk. But he didn't want to go in. So it was a disagreement over tactics as to when you negotiate it. And I would say, on the whole, I could even sympathize with Kennedy's position on this. If you're going to talk, start out tough, for a couple of days and then talk. But Kennedy did not at all rule out the notion of discussing even Guantanamo.

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MIKOYAN: So if Khrushchev mentioned Guantanamo in the last letter as his condition.

DE: I think Kennedy would have said, - well, what the hell? The way you could put it, by the way, was - no foreign bases in Cuba. They discussed that. There was discussion of it. We said, - we'll just take no foreign bases, no foreign, Soviets can't have a base. We don't have a base. So several people said, - that was an acceptable notion. You wouldn't make it as a concession, they'll just say, - no foreign bases, sounds alright. So, that would have been _____. I'm saying, he could have succeeded but, of course, he underestimated the risks in two ways; one, of course, he underestimated that Kennedy would feel the necessity to do something bold and violent and daring. He had to do something. Khrushchev didn't realize that. So, he chose the blockade, which, after all was genuinely dangerous. It was an act of war. The blockade, we think now, since nothing happened, and since it compares it with the hitting the missiles, it was safer. We think of the blockade as though that was a perfectly safe thing. What the hell, people were very worried about it when they did it and rightly so. And I could even ask you, - was it all that safe to do the blockade?

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MIKOYAN: No, absolutely not safe because the Admiral who was in charge of it, he could have ordered fire at any ship which would go beyond the line. And our ships could do it.

DE: That was up to the Admiral wouldn't have Khrushchev have controlled that?

MIKOYAN: No, no, American Admiral, that he talked to, with that Admiral and asked him, - what he will do if the Russians are still going?

DE: No, I'm saying, the risk is, might the Russians have kept going? That was the question.

MIKOYAN: Yes, of course.

DE: And you think so, that they might have? That's the question.

MIKOYAN: Well, it's difficult to tell on what day ...

DE: Remember the speech is on Washington time, the speech is Monday night. And on the Washington time, the blockade was to go into effect mid-morning on Wednesday. So there was almost two days time.

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MIKOYAN: As far as I remember our ships continued to move and then the United States, I don't remember whom, McNamara or John Kennedy himself, they moved the line so as make those Soviet ships not to break that line.

7 DE: That's a story, by the way, there's evidence on both sides of that. It's peculiar. That story is told that he changed at David Ormsby Gore's suggestion, that he changed the line to 500 miles inside. But, other people say, - well the order from the beginning was 500 miles from Cuba. But then they say, well, maybe - it's not clear whether that actually happened or not. But anyway, one story is, that we heard from the Soviet side was that Khrushchev's initial reaction to the speech was that he was very angry and that he ordered the ships to keep going. You think that's true or you know that's true?

MIKOYAN: Yes, yes, yes.

DE: It is true?

MIKOYAN: Yes, because at that moment, he still was not willing to submit to ...

BKw JPK

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DE: How do you know that? Do you know that from your father?

MIKOYAN: Well, this was the common knowledge.

DE: Another story is that it was your father who somehow persuaded him to change that or countermanded that order somehow. Is that from you or did somebody else say that? Somebody said that Mikoyan somehow got that order changed. The order did change. The question is, - who changed it?

MIKOYAN: I did not say it.

DE: Have you heard that story?

MIKOYAN: Yes, but I don't remember who exactly gave this information.

DE: Well anyway, he did do something dangerous and of course Khrushchev had not expected him either to do anything dangerous and specifically, probably, at that point, they didn't expect a blockade because the missiles are already in Cuba, at least a lot of them are. So, I take it, they didn't really think of, might they blockade Cuba after we have the missiles there, right? Say that he

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expected Kennedy(?) to tell Kennedy that the missiles were there at some point. He didn't expect Kennedy to blockade that point because it was too late, there was no point in blockading.

MIKOYAN: Well, for some other missiles it was okay but there were missiles with warheads of the _____.

DE: You know, by the way, that Ray Klein and others ...

MIKOYAN: Excuse me, and you must take into account that Khrushchev ordered to hasten the construction and they worked all day and all night.

DE: That was in order to deter Kennedy by making them operational, is that the point? Why did he order that?

MIKOYAN: To be ready for every development.

DE: See, one could ask the question, why did he send warheads there?

MIKOYAN: I must tell you that we were not in such condition of panic as Americans were.

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DE: Were any Soviets very panicky or not?

MIKOYAN: Not very because everything was not public. All this was, you see, in America everybody knew because there were speeches, there were announcements, declarations and so on. And we had no such publicity over it.

DE: But you were talking to your father during that week, during the week of the open crises? You were living with him in the same place. In that same apartment where we were?

MIKOYAN: No, no, in Lenin(?) Hill. You see, yes, but he wouldn't like to tell me the things which were ...

MBG: Classified.

MIKOYAN: Yes. ... not to disclose anything.

DE: So he didn't tell you during that week what was going on?

MIKOYAN: No.

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DE: Did he seem anxious or not?

MIKOYAN: Well, he came back very late and, too late and was very serious and thinking but he did not tell.

DE: Do you have any awareness of this question, did he ever tell you later, this question that arose of the two letters, the Friday night letter and the Saturday night, morning letter?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: Americans always interpret that as a change of policy or a change...

MIKOYAN: No, I ____ explanation of the man in the Ministry for Foreign Relations who told me that he was one of the author of the letter, official one

DE: The Saturday morning letter about Turkey.

MIKOYAN: ... which came later.

DE: Yes, the one that talked about a trade in the Turkish missiles, yeah.

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MIKOYAN: This was compiled in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this man, his name is Mandeleovich. He participated in our last discussion but I'm afraid he didn't speak. I even asked him, - why you are not speaking? And he told me that, - I asked for permission to speak but I am on the line but I cannot wait. I must go. So he did not speak loudly but he told me and I went with him to his car and I asked him and he told me, - I was in the group who wrote that letter.

DE: With Khrushchev or not, was Khrushchev part of the group?

MIKOYAN: No, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then sent to Khrushchev.

DE: Under Gromyko then?

MIKOYAN: Yes, under Gromyko. And actually, it was compiled and written before the letter of Khrushchev himself.

DE: Before, that's very interesting.

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MIKOYAN: It was sent by usual way of sending, you see. So
it took time, much more time than the letter ...

DE: You mean it was intended to arrive earlier? It would
have been intended to arrive, that's very interesting.

MIKOYAN: Exactly, it was intended to go before that to
come before but it was late. And the letter, Khrushchev
was dictated later but came before.

DE: And that was dictated by Khrushchev himself?

MIKOYAN: Yes.

DE: Did anyone else work on that, ^{Berlotzsky} Berlotzsky(?) or ...?

MIKOYAN: No.

DE: Not Berlotzsky?

MIKOYAN: Berlotzsky was absolutely, he was no relation to
this matter. Absolutely.

DE: Oh really, he was not involved in the crises at that
time?

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?!

{ MIKOYAN: Absolutely, all the talk about his being a speech
writer for Khrushchev is false.

DE: He never wrote speeches ever for Khrushchev?

MIKOYAN: See he was in the ..

DE: Are your lights on?

MIKOYAN: It's okay. [TAPE CUT].

[END OF SIDE B].